



Mediawatch’s review [1] of coverage
of the relationship between bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or
‘mad cow disease’) and human
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD)
coincided with disclosure of 10 new,
suspicious CJD cases in the UK. The
people affected were much younger
than normal for CJD and had
significantly different pathology. The
UK Spongiform Encephalopathy
Advisory Committee (SEAC) advised
the government that the most likely
— but by no means certain —
explanation was exposure to the agent
responsible for BSE. Thought to be a
prion, the agent probably first affected
cows when their feedstuffs contained
tissues from sheep with scrapie, before
such feedstuffs were banned in 1989.
The intense furore that followed
the SEAC’s announcement showed
some sections of the media,
particularly television, at their worst.
As before, however, many print
journalists tackled a complex issue
with considerable skill. And, again,
politicians surpassed themselves in
failing to make the all-important
distinction between expert advice and
their own responsibilities to public
health and the agricultural industry.
On the credit side, broadsheet
newspapers allocated many pages to
meticulous dissections of what is, and
is not, known about the two (or
three?) diseases. On 21 March, for
example, the Independent carried (in
addition to an editorial, a political
commentary and readers’ letters) 14
pieces on different aspects of the
story — a total of some 9 000 words.
All the articles were written against
pressing deadlines the previous day,
and covered, inter alia, the SEAC’s
findings and the government’s
response, evidence for the new type
of CJD, descriptions of individual
patients, epidemiology of CJD and
BSE, European reactions and the
positions of organizations represent-
ing farmers, consumers and the food
industry. Embedded within such
extensive reportage were careful
explanations of several levels of
uncertainty in the evidence, and
discussions of risk assessment.
Scientists prone to criticise the media
might ponder the contrast between
an accomplishment of this sort and
the more leisurely task of honing a
research paper over many weeks. 
The tabloid press — often
unjustly maligned by those who
confuse simplicity with inaccuracy —
performed less creditably on this
occasion. Consider the Daily Mirror of
21 March. Under the headline “THE
PROOF” and a photograph of a
seriously ill woman thought to be
one of the 10 new cases of 
CJD/BSE, the paper announced
unambiguously: “Mad Cow Disease
killed mum Michelle Bowen. It may
kill her son Tony and now experts
say it could kill 500 000 of YOU.”
The furore over BSE/CJD showed
some of the media at their worst 
Television programmes adopted
the same approach. Presenters
interviewed “victims’ relatives”,
usually sensitively but rarely with any
warning that it was impossible to draw
conclusions about aetiology from such
individual experiences. They then
compounded the offence in two other
ways. Firstly, ministers and scientists
were pressed repeatedly to give more
definitive answers than the evidence
allowed, or to estimate the precise,
quantitative risk BSE posed for the
average beef-eater. “Is it one in a
million or one in ten million?”, TV
interviewer David Frost wanted to
know, as though the difference were
of any practical significance. Secondly,
and coupled with several assertions
that scientists created the problem in
the first place, there was a lamentable
failure to recognize that without
science we would scarcely be aware of
the BSE/CJD scenario at all. As MRC
statistician Sheila Gore observed [2],
the CJD surveillance unit established
in Edinburgh in 1990 has been
spectacularly successful — not least in
discerning the 10 new cases, and their
possible significance, in a population
of 55 million. Yet some journalists and
pundits have been keener to blame
science than to praise it. 
There was a predictably different
line from Prime Minister John Major.
On 28 March, he blamed the media
and opposition politicians for
whipping up a crisis. This was the
same Mr Major who, five months
earlier, announced: “I should make it
clear that humans do not get mad
cow disease”. Having extrapolated
far beyond the advice of the SEAC at
that time, he and his ministers
switched to adhering tenaciously to
its necessarily qualified later verdict,
and they refused to acknowledge
that concrete action was needed to
restore confidence at home and
abroad. Others were left to underline
the inadequacy of that position.
But action was required, and was
eventually agreed with Britain’s
European Union partners, in the
form of some type of cow cull. The
government had moved from a
sequence of obstinate assertions
about the total safety of beef eating,
to an angry U-turn, and had lost
public confidence as a result. Such a
debacle was eminently avoidable.
Had successive ministers followed
both the letter and spirit of their
expert advice, prudent government
action could have reflected genuine
scientific knowledge. Instead, Mr
Major and colleagues had to face a
‘double whammy’ of costly measures
disproportionate to the actual risk
and falling even lower in esteem
than they were before.
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